A portable germanium detector was used to detect gamma-ray emissions from a nuclear warhead aboard the Soviet cruiser Slava. Measurements taken on the missile launch tube indicated the presence of uranium-235 and plutonium-239-the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the use of this equipment, these isotopes probably could have been identified at a distance of 4 meters from the warhead. Such inspections do not reveal detailed information ab<>ut.the design of the warhead.
To explore the ut::;LY of various radiation detectors for verification purposes, a series of simple experiments was carried OUt on 5 July 1989 on the Black Sea near Yalta under the auspices of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Na"y provided the cruiser Slal'a ( Fig. 1 ) (4). We were informed that the Slava was armed with a single nuclear-armed SS-N-l2 SLCM in the outside, forward launcher on the starboard side, and that no other nuclear weapons were on board during the experiment. Teams of scientists from the NRDC and the U.S.S.R. used seven different types of detectors. The characteristics of these instruments are summarized in Table 1 . Instruments 1 to 4 were portable devices; all except number 7 detected gamma rays.
In this article we discuss measurements that were made with detector number 1, a c03..\:ialhigh-purity germanium detector. The 151-cm~sensitive volume was cylindrical: 5.9 em in diameter and 5.9 em long (5) . It had an energy re<'-'!ution of about 2 keY (full width at half-maximum) at an energy of 1000 keY. The detector pulses were analyzed with a portable multichannel analyzer with 4096 channels (6) . Only those gamma rays with energies between 30 and 2670 keY were recorded.
We made the following measurements on the Slava: three mea-SU;'''i1)ents,totaling about 24 min, on the launch tube directly above the warhead (7); one 10-min measurement on the adjacent empty launch tube; and two background measurements lasting 60 and 10 min on the deck of the ship about 27 and 32 m in front of the launch tube. The total count rates in these four locations were 393.2 ± 0.5 counts per second (cps), 36.3 ± 0.3 cps, 11.23 ± 0,06 cps, and 11.14 ± 0.14 cps, respectively (errors are from counting statistics only).
The three measurements on the launch tube were combined to form a single 24-min measurement (8); the combined spectrum is shown in Fig. 2 . The spectra were analyzed with three different peak-finding and peak-fittingprograrns to determine the location and intensity of the peaks. The results of the three programs were in excellent agreement; for consistency we will only use those given by the HYrERMET program, which gave the most complete results (9).
The energy' calibration of the detector proceeded in two steps. First, a 6OCosource, which produces strong gamma rays at 1173 and 1332 keV, was used to give a linear relation between channel number and gamma-ray energy. This linear calibration was used to identify 16 prominent gamma-ray emissions in the spectrum shown in Fig. 2 ; the channel numbers and gamma-ray energies of these peaks were then used in a quadratic least-sqlt1rt'~fit (10), Table 2 lists the peaks whose statistical significance exceeded 3 SD above: background (11) . The identity of the parent radionuclidc was identified in everv case but one (12) . Manv of the: lines were due to mU or 239pu; th~presence of eiilier of th~se materials suggests the presence of a nuclear wJrhcJd. In addition, we iJcnritied gJmma rays emirted by 234rnpJ.(a decay product of mU), mBi, and 2°H-r1 (decay products of 23 2 U) (13) , and 241Am (a decay product of 241pu). A liSt of the gamma rays that can be attributed to the presence of uranium and plutonium is given in Table 3 (14) .
Th:.: presence of 232U is noteworthy because it is not a naturally occurring isotope of uranium; it is, however, produced in nuclear re:l.ctors (15). The U.S.S.R. must then:tore have used uranium from reprocessed reactor fuel :lSthe feedstock for the uranium enrichment rocess; 232U would then be enriched along with 235U. However, _ 32 U would not be present in highly enriched uranium that is produced entirc:ly from virgin natural uranium.
The remaining peaks are due to background radiation, neutron reactions, and pair production. For example, the broad peak centered at 478 keY is probably due either to a (n, u) reaction with lOB or to ind:lStic scartering with 7Li (16) . Other neutron-induced gamma rays were emirted at 846.76 keY from (n, n''Y) reactions with 56Fe in steel and at 2223.25 keY from (n, oy) reactions with hydrogen in the fuel of the missile or the high explosive of the warhead. By comparing the spectrum with that taken on the adjacent empty launch tube, we can artribute several peaks to natural background radiation-at 609.31 keY e l4 Bi) and at 1460.83 keY ( 4o K)_and radioactive fallout-at 604.71 ke V ( 134 CS) and at 661.66 keY ( 137 Cs). The peaks at 511, 1592, and 2103 keY a~_ jue to pair production (17) .
For a radioactive source to be identified, its signal at the detector must exceed statistical fluctuations in the background. To minimize the probability of false alarms, a signal is not recorded until an increase of 3 to 5 S Dabove the mean background occurs (18) . We examine two cases: (i) where the signal represems the total count rate integrated over the entire recorded energy spectrum, and (ii) where the signal represents the count rate of discrete gamma-ray emissions.
.The simplest way to search for radioactive material is to record the I. High-purity germ:miumdeteetor, 27 cm! (U.S.) 2. Lithium-driti:ed germanium detector, 14 em 2 (U.S.S.R.) 3. Sodium iodide detector, 100 em 2 (U.S.) 4. Sodium iodide detector, '" 10 em! (U.S.S.R.) 5. Ship-based sodium iodide detector, 2500 cm 2 (U.S.S.R.) 6. Truck-based sodium iodide g:unma-ray telescope. 440 ,m! (U.S.S.R.) i. Helicopter-based 'He neutron detector, 2.5 m~(l'.S.S.R.) total count rate. One first est:l.blishes a value for background count rate for the survey area an~then looks tor a coun~rate that is significancly greater. In our case, however, an J.nalysis of this type suffers from a lack of background measurements taken at many different locations.
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In other words, the count rate on the deck is due almost entirely to background radiation. Most of the terrestrial gamma-ray background flLL\: is due to rad.ionuclides in soil and rock: ,oK and decay producrs of 231 Th and
S U (20).
It is reasonable to assume that these radionuclides would also account for mosr of the gamma-ray flux above a 10,000-ton ship, since steel would be contaminated with K, Th, and U impurities present in iron ore. Because emissions from these radionuclides were 2.0 ± 0.2 rimes more intense in the launch rube spectra man in me deck speerra, we will assume that the roral background counr rate on the launch rubes is rwice as great as that on the deck: B1 = B2 = 22 ± 2 cps (21) .
The maximum disrance in direction i ar which the warhead could have been detecred is given by
where Cmin is the mlIDmUffi count rare: that would indicate the presence of a warhead. If the background were perfectly uniform, Cmin would be determined by counting sratistics; for a counting time of 10 min and a significance level of 3 SD, Cmin could be as lirtle as 4 to 5% above Bi, leading to rmax of 13 to 20 m (22) . The background was not uniform, however. Our analysis suggests that me background above the ship \'aried by about a factOr of 2 over a distance of 30 m. If, as would seem prudent in viC\v of this variability, Cmin must be 30 to 100% above Bj, men rmax would only be 2 to 5 m, and rmax could not be improved by increasing me deteeror area or counting time.
The preceding discussion made no use of me high energy resolution of f,ermanium deteerors. Detecting the characteristic emissions of 23 U or 239pUrepresents far more convincing evidence of the presence of a nuclear warhead than an increase in me total count rate, and avoids confusing warheads with other radioactive sources (for example, depleted-uranium bullets) mat may be on a ship.
Because only minute concentrations of 235U and 239pu are found in common materials, emissions from these radionuclides can be attributed entirely to the warhead (that is, B = 0). The same assumption does not hold for emissions from 2°&r1, however, because 2°&r1is a decay product of both 232U in me warhead and 232Th impurities in the steel. Using the measured intensit::)f the 911-keV line from ::'::8Ac, which is a decay produer of 232Th but not of· 232U, we esrimated that 79 ± 17% of the 20sn decay counts detected on the deck are due to background (23) . .. ..:
>~" " OJ~. ., Applying Eq. 3 to each line, we find that the most detectable emissions ;lr'~the 136-keV line from 1J5U, the 4:14-keV or the 769-k",. une from 23 9 pu, and the 2614-keV line from the decay of 231 U (24). In direction 1 (above the warhead), rmax = 4 m tor :mU and 13~PU,if we Jssume a counting time of 10 min and a significance level of 3 S D; for mU, rma. = 5 m. In direction 2 (to the side of the launch rube), 'ma, = 1.5 m for 235U, 3 m for 1J9pu, and 4 m tor 132U. In direction 3 (in front of the launch rube), 'maK = 6 m tor 135U, 12 m for 239pu, and 6 m for mU; the lid of the launch rube apparently provides le:ss shielding than its sides (25) . It is apparent that one must be fairlv close to the launch rube ro be certain of detecting fissile: materials.
Even if nuclear weapons can be detected as they are normally deployed, they could be concealed by placing shielding around the weapon or by moving the weapon to a part of the ship that is not open to inspection. It may even be possible to produce special nuclear weapons that emit very little radiation (3) .
For the weapon in our experiment, the most stringent requirement for gamma-ray shielding is set by the highly penetrating 2614-keY line. A LOO-fold reduction in the intensity of this line would have been required to make it undetectable ouuide the launch rube; a layer of tungsten at least~cm thick placed between the missile and Table 2 . The observed energy, expected energy, and suspected origin of the peaks in Fig. 2 the launch rube would have been sufficient. Adding this much shielding is fe~iblc: in principle tor the launch rubes we examincd (which had J 12-cm space between the top of the missile and me inside of the launch rube), but the existence of such shielding could be det:ct~d by visual inspection or with a few simple gamma-ray transmiSSion measurements. Concealing a cruise missile in another part of the ship appears to be rather difficult-at 1eJ.stfor the United States (2). Little is known Jbout Soviet equipment; however, in the case of the Slava, it did not appear possible to remove the missiles from the launch rubes while ae sea-at least not without the help of a cranc from a neighboring ship. In cheory it would be possible to remove the warhead trom the missile, conceal it in a shielded box during an inspection, and reinstall it afterward. Ie is noe conSidered credible, however, to install a U.S~SLeM warhead ae sea without seriously compromising the retiabiliry of the missile.
What Can Be Learned About Warhead Design?
It is sometimes said that measurements of gamma-ray spectra mighe reveal sensieive details about the design of nuclear warheads. To investigate this possibility we constructed various models of the warhead on the Slava, wim the thicknesses of the various components adjusted to give the best possible agreement with our measurements.
The observed intensity of a particular gamma-ray emission, C, is equal to the product of the decay rate per grJffi of the parent isotope S, the mass of the parent iSOtOpe .\.1,the self-shielding factor C (chat is, the fraction of gamma rays that exit the source unscattered), the c.'Ctemal shielding factOr F (the fraction of g1fT\rno r1~" '~::;ring dle Table 3 . The observed intensity, branching ratio, and decay rate of gammaray emissions observed in Fig. 2 Dec.1)' r,l(e. The rate at \\'hich a particular gamma ray is emined, S, iẽqual to the branching ratio (gammas per decal') multiplied by the decay rate of the emining radionuclide (decay «)unts per second). The decay rate of the)th daughter, Q;, is given by 1.91 X.10
.=0
l·*h where 1.9 x 10 16 is Avogadro's number (6.02 x 10: 3 atoms per mole) dil'ided bv the number of seconds per year (3.16 x 10'), W is the atomic weight of :',c parent (grams per mole), t is the age of the material (years), and Aj is the decay constant of the ith daughter (yrears-I). (Qo is the activity of the parent, Q 1 is the activity of the first daughter, and so on.)
SclJsliieidillg. If the radioactive material is in the shape of a sphere or an empty spherical shell, then the self-shic:lding factor far from the where f.L is the linear attenuation coefficient and r is the thickness of the shell; 13, which de:pends on the radius ratio of the shell, ranges from 4/3 for solid spheres to 4 for thin shells (3).
E.,cema/ shleldillg. The external shielding factor F pro\'ided by a series of fiat parallel absorbers is given by where f.L; is the linear attenuation coefficient and Xj is the thickness of the ith absorber along the path between the source and the detector. The equation for a series of spherical shells in which the thickness is not much smaller than the radius is much more complicated (3).
EfficicllCY, The detector was calibrated in the laboratory by using where: C; is tb::' '-"~'1unt rate and Bj is the background count rate (countS per second), Q is the activity of the source (decays per second),fis the branching ratio (gammas per decay), and n is the solid angle. Figure 4 shows the: results.
Solid .1IIgle. l\ccurau: evaluation of me ,oiid angle n requires knowledge of the shape and size of the source-information nor provided by the Soviets. We estimated that the: distance from the center of the mi«ile to the center of the deteCTor was 73 ::: 3 em. Since the detector was mounted horizontallv on the launcher, /'l.nal)'sis of the dara. We began our analysis with :39pu, for which we observed gamma-ray emissions at 14 diiferent cn(;rgies from 333 to 769 keV. The plutonium was assumed to be in the form of an empt\' spherical shell in the center of the weapon, surrounded by ;,Jw-, medium-, and high-Z materials, High-explosive was chosen to represent low-Z materials (the relative attenuation cause:d by other common low-Z materials-ber:'!lium, boron, and aluminum-is ver:' similar). Medium-Z materials, such as the steel launch rube, were represented by iron. Uranium represented high-Z materials. The variables in the least-squares !it were the rhicknesses of these three materials and the mass and the outside radius of the plutonium shell. The concentration of 239pu was taken to be 96%.
Th~fact that the low-energy gamma rays from 235U were seen implies that there is very little high-Z material outside the uranium (the mean-tree-path of 186-keV gamma rays is 0.36 rom in uranium). Our initial assumption was a shell 0( ZJ5 U surrounding a shell of~39pu (as in a composite-core fission weapon), but we found it irnpossible to obtain a good fit to either the plutonium or the uranium data with this model. It~on the other hand, we assumed that the 239pUwas immediately surrounded by low-Z material, it was surprisingly easy to obtain acceptable fits (X 2 ::; 1 per degree offreedom) with many combinations of these variables. The combinations that resulted in acceptable fits included plutonium radii of 5.4 to 8.0 cm, plutonium masses of 3 to 6 kg, high-explosive thicknesses of 3 to 10 em, iron thicknesses of6 to 8 cm, and uranium thicknesses of 0.1 to 0.4 cm. In general, changes in the value of one variable could be offset by a combination of changes in other variables. While these values may seem reasonable, it is apparent that this typo.:ui analysis canner uncover sensitive design details.
Using the values given by the above analysis and the count rates of the twO 241 Am gamma rays, we estimated the percentage of~41Pu to be 0.20 :t 0.10%, which corresponds ro a 239pu concentration of 96:t 1% and a~40pUconcentration of 4 :t 1% (26). For comparison, U.S. weapons-grade pluronium typically contains 6% 240pU; supergrade plutonium (used in some U.S. warheads) contains 3% 240pU (27) .
The analysis of the uranium dara is necessarily much less precise because we have only ten lines from all three isotopes and twO additional variables: the concentrations of 2J2 U and 238U. Moreover, the tour 235U lines, which cover a narrow range of low energies (144 to 205 keY), are srJristically decoupled from the five mU lines at much higher energies. The imensity of the single 238U line: cm only be use:d [0 estimate the concentration of that isotope. The dara are roughly consistemwith a 7-[0 IS-kg uranium shell with a radius of about 10 to 15 cm not surrounded by a thick layer of low-Z marerials. The dJta arc also consistem with a~3~UcOIKe:mrarion of 0.1 to 0.2 ppb and a 238Uconcentration of 4 to 6°10 [C .S. we:lponsgrade uranium is 5.5% 238U (27)].
Thus, we do not Qdieve that such measurements arc capable of revealing sensitive information about the design of the warhead. But t;ven if sensitive details could be revealed, there are ways to protect such information.
In general, there seem to be three types of concerns: (i) that the inspeaing nation could learn new weapon design techniques; (ii) that something could be learned about the general technical sophistication of the other nation; and (iii) that the information revealed might aid possible proliferators. The latter problem could be solved simply by keeping the data confide:ntial. The other t'\vo concerns could be: ameliorated by designing special detection equipment that would only calkct data in narrow e:ne:rgy bands of interest (tor example, around 186,414, 769, and 2614 keY).
The measurements we made with the germanium deteaor on the Slava provided valuable information tor building a verification regime for SLCMs. At close range it is possible to derect the fissionable materials in at least one type of warhead, even when it is shielded by a thick launch rube. The ability to clearly identify either 35U or~39pu would provide prima facie evider.ce that a nuclear warhead was contained in a launcher.
Detecting line emissions from 235U and~39~.,"is a more certain and, in the absence of extensive background measurements, a more efficient method of searching for nuclear warheads than looking for an increase in the total count rate. The most intense lines from 235U and~39pU could have been dereaed through the launch rube at a distance of 4 to S m.T he warhead could have been concealed by placing a thick layer of rungsren inside the launch rube, but such shielding could be revealed by simple gamma-ray transmission measurements. Alternatively, the warhead could be removed to a shielded box, although this is not possible for current U.S. SLCMs. Moving the entire SLCM below decks did not appear possible on the Slava.
Our analysis indicates that passive radiation deteaors, even those with high energy resolution, cannot be used to reveal sensitive weapon design information, at least if such measurements are constrained to a few locations and couoring times of less than 1 hour. There simply is toO little information in the spectra to constrain the many possible variables in a realistic warhead design.
Finally, it should be emphasized that passive radiation detection is only one tool of m:tJ1Vthat mav be useful in furure arm, camrol agr~ements. Some types of agr~ements-such as a ban on nuclear weapons on certain naval vessels, or om: in which a particular missile must be identified as conventional or nuclear-might be facilitated by such techniques, whereas other types of agreements might not bene:fir at all.
